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Abstract
This paper presents an argumentation based framework to support an agent’s de-
liberation process for drawing conclusions under a given policy. The argumentative
policy of the agent is able to take into account the roles agents can have within
a context pertaining to an environment of interaction. The framework uses roles
and context to deﬁne policy preferences at diﬀerent levels of deliberation allowing
a modular representation of the agent’s knowledge that avoids the need for explicit
qualiﬁcation of the agent’s decision rules. We also employ a simple form of abduc-
tion to deal with the incompleteness and evolving nature of the agent’s knowledge
of the external environment and illustrate how an agent’s self deliberation can af-
fect the mode of interaction between agents. The high degree of modularity of the
framework gives it a simple computational model in which the agent’s deliberation
can be naturally implemented.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents need to make decisions under complex preference policies
that take into account diﬀerent factors. In general, these policies have a
dynamic nature and are inﬂuenced by the particular state of the environment
in which the agent ﬁnds himself. The agent’s decision process needs to be able
to synthesize together, in a modular way, diﬀerent aspects of his preference
policy and to adapt to new input from the current environment.
In this paper we present an argumentation based framework to support
an agent’s self deliberation process for drawing conclusions under a given
policy. We will consider and extend an argumentation framework developed
over the last decade as a result of a series of studies [11,8,7,10,9,6] on the links
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of argumentation to non-monotonic reasoning. This framework, called Logic
Programming without Negation as Failure (LPwNF ), was proposed originally
in [9] and can be seen as a realization of the more abstract frameworks of
[7,4]. The abstract attacking relation, i.e. its notion of argument and counter-
argument, is realized through monotonic proofs of contrary conclusions and
a priority relation on the sentences of the theory that make up these proofs.
We extend the framework, following the more recent approach of other works
[19,5] to allow this priority relation and thus the attacking relation to be
dynamic, making the framework more suitable for the application of agent
self deliberation.
In this work, we will consider that an agent is composed of a set of mod-
ules each of them being responsible for a particular capability (e.g. problem
solving, cooperation, communication, etc.), and all together implementing the
agent’s overall behavior. Within this the proposed argumentative delibera-
tion model can be used in order to implement the various decision making
processes needed by diﬀerent modules of an agent. For example, the decision
for the choice and achievement of a goal (within the problem solving mod-
ule) or the decision for the choice of the appropriate partners according to a
speciﬁc cooperation protocol (within the cooperation module), etc.
Our argumentation framework captures agent deliberation in a dynamic
external environment. In particular, we will examine the argumentative delib-
eration of an agent according to a given decision policy on a domain of interest
that takes into account the roles ﬁlled by the agents and the context of the
external environment.
Over the last few years argumentation is becoming increasingly important
in agent theory. Several works have proposed argumentation models in the
multi-agent ﬁeld [22,21,17,15,3,1,2]. Our work can be seen as bringing together
work from [21,2] who have suggested that roles can aﬀect an agent’s argumen-
tation, especially within the context of a dialogue, and work from [19,5] who
have shown the need for dynamic priorities within an argumentation frame-
work when we want to apply this to formalize law and other related problems.
In this paper, we put together these ideas proposing a new argumentation
framework for agent deliberation obtained by extending the argumentation
framework of (LPwNF ) [9,6] to include dynamic priorities. We also employ a
simple form of abduction to deal with the incompleteness and evolving nature
of the agent’s knowledge of the external environment.
We show how our framework can encompass the inﬂuence that the diﬀerent
relative roles of interacting agents and the context of the particular interaction
can have on the deliberation process of the agents. Roles and context deﬁne
in a natural way dynamic priorities on the argumentative decision rules of
the agent at two diﬀerent levels in the deliberation process. These priorities
are represented within the overall argumentation theory of the agent in two
corresponding modular parts.
Section 2 reviews the basic argumentation framework of LPwNF . Sec-
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tion 3, extends this framework to allow dynamic priorities and formulates
the general framework of argumentative agent deliberation. It gives the basic
concepts of roles and context and how these are captured through dynamic
priorities in argumentation. Section 4 discusses related and future work.
2 The Argumentation Framework of LPwNF
An agent has his own theory expressing the knowledge under which he will
take decisions. This decision process needs to compare alternatives and arrive
at a conclusion that reﬂects a certain policy of the agent. In this paper we for-
malize this type of agent reasoning via argumentation where the deliberation
of an agent is captured through an argumentative evaluation of arguments
and counter-arguments.
There are several frameworks of argumentation proposed recently (e.g.
[18,4]) that could be adopted for formalizing an agent’s deliberation. We
will use the framework presented in [9,6], called Logic Programming without
Negation as Failure (LPwNF ) (The historical reasons for this name are not
directly relevant to this paper). We brieﬂy review this framework and then
study its extension needed to accommodate roles and context in argumentative
deliberation.
In LPwNF a non-monotonic argumentation theory is viewed as a pool of
sentences (or rules) from which we must select a suitable subset, i.e. an argu-
ment, to reason with, e.g. to support a conclusion. Sentences in a LPwNF
theory are written in the usual extended logic programming language with an
explicit negation, but without the Negation as Failure (NAF) operator. We
will often refer to the sentences of a theory as argument rules. In addition,
these rules may be assigned locally a ”relative strength” through a partial
ordering relation. For example, we may have
fly(X)← bird(X) ¬fly(X)← penguin(X)
bird(X)← penguin(X) bird(tweety)
with an ordering relation between the rules that assigns the second rule higher
than the ﬁrst. This theory captures the usual example of ”ﬂying birds” with its
exceptions, without the use of explicit qualiﬁcations of the default rules with
abnormality conditions. We can conclude that tweety ﬂies since we can derive
this from the ﬁrst rule and there is no way to derive ¬fly(tweety). We have
an argument (i.e. a proof) for fly(tweety) but no argument for ¬fly(tweety).
If we add to the theory penguin(tweety) then we can derive both fly(tweety)
and ¬fly(tweety) - we have an argument for either conclusion. But in the
non-monotonic argumentation semantics of the theory we can only conclude
¬fly(tweety). This overrides fly(tweety) since the argument that derives
¬fly(tweety) contains the second rule which is designated higher than the
ﬁrst rule which belongs to the argument that derives fly(tweety). We say
that the argument for ¬fly(tweety) attacks the argument for fly(tweety) but
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not vice-versa. In general, the argumentation-based framework of LPwNF is
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Formulae in the background logic (L,  ) of the framework
are deﬁned as L← L1, . . . , Ln, where L,L1, . . . , Ln are positive or explicit
negative ground literals. The derivability relation,  , of the logic is given by
the single inference rule of modus ponens 3 .
Together with the set of sentences of a theory T , we are given an ordering
relation < on these sentences (where φ < ψ or < (φ, ψ) means that φ has
lower priority than ψ). The role of the priority relation is to encode locally
the relative strength of argument rules in the theory. The relation< is required
to be irreﬂexive.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An argumentation theory (T , <) is a set of sentences T
in L together with a priority relation < on the sentences of T . An argument
for a literal L in a theory (T , <) is any subset of T that derives L, T  L,
under the background logic.
In general, we can separate out a part of the theory T0 ⊂ T (e.g. the last
two rules of the example above) and consider this as a non-defeasible part
from which any argument rule can draw information that it might need. The
notion of attack between arguments in a theory T is based on the possible
conﬂicts between a literal L and its explicit negation ¬L and on the priority
relation < on T .
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let (T , <) be a theory and T, T ′ ⊆ T . Then T ′ attacks T
(or T ′ is a counter argument of T ) iﬀ there exists L, T1 ⊆ T ′ and T2 ⊆ T
s.t.:
(i) T1 min L and T2 min ¬L
(ii) (∃r′ ∈ T1, r ∈ T2 s.t. r′ < r) ⇒ (∃r′ ∈ T1, r ∈ T2 s.t. r < r′).
Here T min L means that T  L under the background logic and that L
can not be derived from any proper subset of T . The second condition in this
deﬁnition states that an argument T ′ for L attacks an argument T for the
contrary conclusion only if the set of rules that it uses to prove L are at least
of the same strength (under the priority relation <) as the set of rules in T
used to prove the contrary. Note that the attacking relation is not necessarily
symmetric.
Using this notion of attack we then deﬁne the central notions of an ad-
missible argument of a given theory and the non-monotonic argumentation
consequence relation of a given theory as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let (T , <) be a theory and T a subset of T . Then T is
admissible iﬀ T is consistent and for any T ′ ⊆ T if T ′ attacks T then T
3 The background logic of this argumentation framework can be replaced with any mono-
tonic ﬁrst order logic.
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attacks T ′.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let T = (T , <) be a theory and L a ground literal. Then L
is a credulous (resp. skeptical) consequence of T iﬀ L holds in a (resp.
every) maximal (wrt set inclusion) admissible subset of T .
3 Argumentative Agent Deliberation
In this section we will extend the LPwNF framework to allow dynamic prior-
ities and use this to formulate the general framework of argumentative agent
deliberation. Within this framework we will be interested in capturing the
basic concepts of agent roles and context of interaction between agents.
Agents are always integrated within a (social) environment of interaction.
We call this the context of interaction. This determines relationships between
the possible roles the diﬀerent agents can have within the environment. We
consider, in line with much of the agent literature, (e.g. [16,23]), a role as a
set of behaviour obligations, rights and privileges determining its interaction
with other roles.
Generally, the substance of roles is associated to a default context that
deﬁnes shared social relations of diﬀerent forms (e.g. authority, friendship,
relationship, etc.) and speciﬁes the behaviour of roles between each others.
Consequently, it implicitly installs a partial order between roles that expresses
preferences of behaviour. For instance in the army context an oﬃcer gives
orders that are obeyed by a soldier, or in a everyday context we respond in
favour more easily to a friend than to a stranger. However, a default context
that determines the basic roles ﬁlled by the agents is not the only environment
where they could interact. For example, two friends can also be colleagues
or an oﬃcer and a soldier can be family friends in civil life. Therefore we
consider a second level of context, called speciﬁc context, which can overturn
the pre-imposed, by the default context, ordering between roles and establish a
diﬀerent social relation between them. For instance, the authority relationship
between an oﬃcer and a soldier would change under the speciﬁc context of a
social meeting at home or the speciﬁc context of treason by the oﬃcer.
3.1 Argumentation with Roles and Context
In order to accommodate in an agent’s argumentative reasoning the roles
and context as described above we can extend the framework of LPwNF so
that the priority relation of a theory is not simply a static relation but a
dynamic relation that captures the non-static preferences associated to roles
and context. There is a natural way to do this. Following the same philosophy
of approach as in [19], the priority relation can be deﬁned as part of the agent’s
theory T and then be given the same argumentation semantics along with the
rest of the theory.
We distinguish the part of the theory that deﬁnes the priority relation by
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P . Rules in P have the same form as any other rule, namely ground rules of the
form L← L1, . . . , Ln where the head L refers to the (irreﬂexive) higher-priority
relation, i.e. L has the general form L = h p(rule1, rule2). Also for any
ground atom h p(rule1, rule2) its negation is denoted by h p(rule2, rule1) and
vice-versa. For simplicity of presentation we will assume that the conditions
of any rule in the theory do not refer to the predicate h p thus avoiding self-
reference problems. We now need to extend the semantic deﬁnitions of attack
and admissibility.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let (T ,P) be a theory, T, T ′ ⊆ T and P, P ′ ⊆ P. Then (T ′, P ′)
attacks (T, P ) iﬀ there exists a literal L, T1 ⊆ T ′, T2 ⊆ T , P1 ⊆ P ′ and P2 ⊆ P
s.t.:
(i) T1 ∪ P1 min L and T2 ∪ P2 min ¬L
(ii) (∃r′ ∈ T1∪P1, r ∈ T2∪P2 s.t. T∪P  h p(r, r′)) ⇒ (∃r′ ∈ T1∪P1, r ∈ T2∪P2
s.t. T ′ ∪ P ′  h p(r′, r)).
Here, when L does not refer to h p, T ∪ P min L means that T min L.
This extended deﬁnition means that a composite argument (T ′, P ′) is a counter-
argument to another such argument when they derive a contrary conclusion,
L, and (T ′ ∪ P ′) makes the rules of its counter proof at least ”as strong” as
the rules for the proof by the argument that is under attack. Note that now
the attack can occur on a contrary conclusion L that refers to the priority
between rules.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let (T ,P) be a theory, T ⊆ T and P ⊆ P. Then (T, P ) is
admissible iﬀ (T ∪ P ) is consistent and for any (T ′, P ′) if (T ′, P ′) attacks
(T, P ) then (T, P ) attacks (T ′, P ′).
Hence when we have dynamic priorities, for an object-level argument (from
T ) to be admissible it needs to take along with it priority arguments (from P)
to make itself at least ”as strong” as the opposing counter-arguments. This
need for priority rules can repeat itself when the initially chosen ones can
themselves be attacked by opposing priority rules and again we would need
to make now the priority rules themselves at least as strong as their opposing
ones.
We can now deﬁne an agent’s argumentation theory for describing his
policy in an environment with roles and context as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.3 An agent’s argumentative policy theory or theory, T ,
is a triple T = (T ,PR,PC) where the rules in T do not refer to h p, all the
rules in PR are priority rules with head h p(r1, r2) s.t. r1, r2 ∈ T and all rules
in PC are priority rules with head h p(R1, R2) s.t. R1, R2 ∈ PR ∪ PC .
We therefore have three levels in an agent’s theory. In the ﬁrst level we
have the rules T that refer directly to the subject domain of the agent. We
call these the Object-level Decision Rules of the agent. In the other two
levels we have rules that relate to the policy under which the agent uses his
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object-level decision rules according to roles and context. We call the rules
in PR and PC , Role (or Default Context) Priorities and (Speciﬁc)
Context Priorities respectively.
As an example, consider the following theory T representing (part of) the
object-level decision rules of an employee in a company 4 .
r1(A,Obj, A1) : give(A,Obj, A1)← requests(A1, Obj, A)
r2(A,Obj, A1) : ¬give(A,Obj, A1)← needs(A,Obj)
r3(A,Obj, A2, A1) : ¬give(A,Obj, A2)← give(A,Obj, A1), A2 = A1.
In addition, we have a theory PR representing the general default behaviour
of the code of contact in the company relating to the roles of its employees:
a request from a superior is in general stronger than an employee’s own need;
a request from another employee from a competitor department is in general
weaker than its own need. Here and below we will use capitals to name the
priority rules but these are not to be read as variables. Also for clarity of pre-
sentation we do not write explicitly the full name of a priority rule omitting
in the name the ground terms of the rules.
R1 : h p(r1(A,Obj, A1), r2(A,Obj, A1))← higher rank(A1, A)
R2 : h p(r2(A,Obj, A1), r1(A,Obj, A1))← competitor(A,A1)
R3 : h p(r1(A,Obj, A1), r1(A,Obj, A2))← higher rank(A1, A2)
Between the two alternatives to satisfy a request from a superior from a com-
peting department or not, the ﬁrst is stronger when these two departments
are in the speciﬁc context of working together on a common project. On the
other hand, if we are in a case where the employee who has an object and
needs it, needs this urgently then he would prefer to keep it. Such policy is
represented at the third level in PC :
C1 : h p(R1(A,Obj, A1), R2(A,Obj, A1))← common(A,Obj, A1)
C2 : h p(R2(A,Obj, A1), R1(A,Obj, A1))← urgent(A,Obj).
Note the modularity of this representation. For example, if the company de-
cides to change its policy ”that employees should generally satisfy the requests
of their superiors” to apply only to the direct manager of an employee we would
simply replace R1 by the new rule R
′
1 without altering any other part of the
theory:
R′1 : h p(r1(A,Obj, A1), r2(A,Obj, A1))← manager(A1, A).
Consider now a scenario where we have two agents ag1 and ag2 working
4 Non-ground rules represent their instances in a given Herbrand universe.
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in competing departments and that ag2 requests an object from ag1. This is
represented by extra statements in the non-defeasible part, T0, of the theory,
e.g. competitor(ag2, ag1), requests(ag2, obj, ag1). Should ag1 give the object
to ag2 or not?
If ag1 does not need the object then, there are only admissible arguments
for giving the object, e.g. ∆1 = ({r1(ag1, obj, ag2)}, {}) and supersets of this.
This is because this does not have any counter-argument as there are no argu-
ments for not giving the object since needs(ag1, obj) does not hold. Suppose
now that needs(ag1, obj) does hold. In this case we do have an argument
for not giving the object, namely ∆2 = ({r2(ag1, obj, ag2)}, {}). This is of
the same strength as ∆1 but the argument ∆
′
2, formed by replacing in ∆2
its empty set of rules of priority with {R2(r2(ag1, obj, ag2), r1(ag1, obj, ag2))},
attacks ∆1 and any of its supersets but not vice-versa: R2 gives higher prior-
ity to the rules of ∆2 and there is no set of priority rules with which we can
extend ∆1 to give its object-level rules equal priority as those of ∆2. Hence we
conclude skeptically that ag1 will not give the object. This skeptical conclu-
sion was based on the fact that the theory of ag1 cannot prove that ag2 is of
higher rank than himself. If the agent learns that higher rank(ag2, ag1) does
hold then ∆
′
2 and ∆
′
1, obtained by adding to the priority rules of ∆1 the set
{R1(r1(ag1, obj, ag2), r2(ag1, obj, ag2))}, attack each other. Each one of these
is an admissible argument for not giving or giving the object respectively and
so we can draw both conclusions credulously.
Suppose that we also know that the requested object is for a common
project of ag1 and ag2. The argument ∆
′
2 is now not admissible since now it has
another attack obtained by adding to the priority rule of ∆
′
1 the extra priority
rule C1(R1(ag1, obj, ag2), R2(ag1, obj, ag2)) thus strengthening its derivation of
h p(r1, r2). The attack now is on the contrary conclusion h p(r1, r2). In other
words, the argumentative deliberation of the agent has moved one level up
to examine what priority would the diﬀerent roles have, within the speciﬁc
context of a common project. ∆
′
2 cannot attack back this attack and no
extension of it exists that would strengthen its rules to do so. Hence there are
no admissible arguments for not giving and ag1 draws the skeptical conclusion
to give the object.
We have seen in the above example that in several cases the admissibility of
an argument depends on whether we have or not some background information
about the speciﬁc case in which we are reasoning. For example, ag1 may not
have information on whether their two departments are in competition or
not. This means that ag1 cannot build an admissible argument for not giving
the object as he cannot use the priority rule R2 that he might like to do.
But this information maybe just unknown and if ag1 wants to ﬁnd a way
to refuse the request he can reason further to ﬁnd assumptions related to
the unknown information under which he can build an admissible argument.
Hence in this example he would build an argument for not giving the object to
ag2 that is conditional on the fact that they belong to competing departments.
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Furthermore, this type of information may itself be dynamic and change while
the rest of the theory of the agent remains ﬁxed, e.g. ag1 may have in his theory
that ag2 belongs to a competing department but he has not yet learned that
ag2 has changed department or that his department is no longer a competing
one.
We can formalize this conditional form of argumentative reasoning by
deﬁning the notion of supporting information and extending argumentation
with abduction on this missing information.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Let T = (T0, T ,P) be a theory, and A a distinguished set of
predicates in the language of the theory, called abducible predicates 5 . Given
a goal G, a set S of abducible literals consistent with the non-defeasible part
T0 of T , is called a strong (resp. weak) supporting evidence for G iﬀ G
is a skeptical (resp. credulous) consequence of (T0 ∪ S, T ,P).
The structure of an argument can also be generalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let T = (T0, T ,P) be a theory and A its abducible predi-
cates. A supported argument in T is a tuple (∆, S), where S is a set of
abducible literals consistent with T0 and ∆ is a set of argument rules in T ,
which is not admissible in T , but is admissible in the theory (T0 ∪ S, T ,P).
We say that S supports the argument ∆.
The supporting information expressed through the abducibles predicates
refers to the incomplete and evolving information of the external environment
of interaction. Typically, this information pertains to the context of the en-
vironment, the roles between agents or any other aspect of the environment
that is dynamic. We will see below an example of how agents can acquire
and/or validate such information through a scenario of interaction where they
exchange missing information.
Given the above framework the argumentative deliberation of an agent
can be formalized via the following basic reasoning functions.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Let Ag be an agent, T his argumentation theory, G a goal
and S a set of supporting information consistent with T0. Then we say
that Ag deliberates on G, supported by S, to produce sag, denoted by
deliberate(Ag,G, S; sag), iﬀ sag = {} is a strong supporting evidence for G
in the theory T ∪ S. If sag = {} then we say that Ag accepts G under
T ∪ S and is denoted by accept(Ag, G, S). Furthermore, given an oppos-
ing goal G (e.g ¬G) to G and s′ produced by deliberation on G, i.e. that
deliberate(Ag,G, S; s′) holds, we say that s′ is supporting evidence for agent
Ag to refuse G in T ∪ S.
We will now illustrate the use of the argumentative deliberation of an
agent, deﬁned above, within a simple interaction protocol where two agents
5 Typically, the theory T does not contain any rules for the abducible predicates.
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are trying to agree on some goal, as an example of how this argumentation
framework can be used within the diﬀerent decision making processes of an
agent. In our study of this we will be mainly interested how agents can use
their argumentative deliberation in order to decide their position at each step
of the interaction process. We will not be concerned with the conversation
protocol supporting the agent interaction.
Let us therefore consider a scenario where two self-interested agents, a seller
and a buyer, are trying to agree on a goal to determine the price of a certain
product. In particular, let us consider a seller agent called X who has the goal,
GX , to sell a product at a high price to another agent, the buyer, called Y,
who has the (opposing) goal, GY , to buy this product at a low price. They are
trying to ﬁnd an agreement on the price by agreeing either on GX or on GY .
Furthermore, we will assume that during their interaction each agent initially
insists on its own goal exchanging between them supporting information for
their respective goals. When one of the agents cannot ﬁnd anymore, within
his theory and the accumulated supporting information (agreed by the two
agents so far), an argument for his own goal he then considers the goal of the
other agent. He deliberates on this to see if he can ﬁnd, again according to
his own theory and the supporting information agreed on so far, an argument
that would support this goal of the other agent.
We assume that the seller has the following argumentation policy for selling
products. We present only a part of this theory.
The object-level theory T X of the seller contains the rules:
r1 : sell(Prd,A, high price)← pay normal(A,Prd)
r2 : sell(Prd,A, high price)← pay install(A,Prd)
r3 : sell(Prd,A, low price)← pay cash(A,Prd)
r4 : ¬sell(Prd,A, P2)← sell(Prd,A, P1), P2 = P1.
His role and context priority theories, PXR and PXC , are given below. They
contain the policy of the seller on how to treat the various types of customers.
For example, to prefer to sell with normal paying conditions over payment by
installments when the buyer is a normal customer (see R1). Also that there is
always a preference to sell at high price (see R2, R3) but for regular customers
there are conditions under which the seller would sell at low price (see R4, R5).
This low price oﬀer to a regular customer applies only when we are not in high
season (see C1, C2).
R1 : h p(r1(Prd,A), r2(Prd,A))← normal(A)
R2 : h p(r1(Prd,A), r3(Prd,A))
R3 : h p(r2(Prd,A), r3(Prd,A))
R4 : h p(r3(Prd,A), r1(Prd,A))← regular(A), buy 2(A,Prd)
R5 : h p(r3(Prd,A), r1(Prd,A))← regular(A), late del(A,Prd)
C1 : h p(R2(Prd,A), R4(Prd,A))← high season
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C2 : h p(R2(Prd,A), R5(Prd,A))← high season
C3 : h p(R4(Prd,A), R5(Prd,A)).
Given this theory the seller will initially oﬀer to sell at a high price under
normal paying conditions assuming that the buyer is a normal customer. Let
us suppose that the buyer responds that this price is expensive. Given this
new information the seller agent deliberating again on his goal, ﬁnds another
argument for selling high, using now the object-level rule r2 since he can no
longer consider the buyer a normal customer and hence R1 does not apply
(the seller derives this from some general background knowledge that he has
in T0 e.g. from a rule ¬normal(A) ← expensive(A, high price)). This new
argument needs the support pay install(buyer, prd) and the seller oﬀers this
information to the buyer.
Suppose that the buyer refuses this method of payment. Then the seller
agent does not have any other argument (that is allowed given the information
exchanged so far) to support his own goal of selling high. He could then
consider the goal of the buyer, i.e. to sell at low price. Deliberating on this
goal he ﬁnds that his argumentation theory can support this if the customer
is a regular one and he can accept some other conditions. He indeed ﬁnds an
admissible argument for low price using the object-level rule r3 and the role
priority ruleR4. This is conditional on the information that the buyer is indeed
a regular customer, will pay cash and that he will buy two of the products.
Note that for this argument to be admissible the context rule C1 must not
apply, i.e. the seller knows that currently they are not in a high season.
Suppose that the buyer conﬁrms the ﬁrst two conditions but refuses the third.
The seller then has another argument for selling low to a regular customer
conditional on late delivery.
3.2 Modularity and Computation
As mentioned above, the proposed framework allows modular representations
of problems where a change in the policy of an agent can be eﬀected locally in
his theory. The following results formalize some of the properties of modularity
of the framework.
Proposition 3.7 Let ∆ be a set of arguments that is admissible separately
with respect to the theory T1 = (T ,PR1, {}) and the theory T2 = (T ,PR2, {}).
Then ∆ is admissible with respect to the theory T = (T ,PR1 ∪PR2, {}). Sim-
ilarly, we can decompose PC into PC1 and PC2.
Proposition 3.8 Let ∆ be a set of arguments that is admissible with respect to
the theory T1 = (T ,PR, {}). Suppose also that ∆ is admissible with respect to
T2 = (T ∪PR, {},PC). Then ∆ is admissible with respect to T = (T ,PR,PC).
The later proposition shows that we can build an admissible argument
∆ = (O,R) by joining together an object-level argument O together with a
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set of priority rules R that makes O admissible and is itself admissible with
respect to the higher level of context priorities. These results provide the
basis for a modular computational model in terms of interleaving levels of
admissibility processes one for each level of arguments in the theory.
In general, the basic LPwNF has a simple and well understood compu-
tational model [6] that can be seen as a realization of a more abstract com-
putational model for argumentation [13]. It has been successfully used [12] to
provide a computational basis for reasoning about actions and change. The
simple argumentation semantics of LPwNF , where the attacking relation be-
tween arguments depends only on the priority of the rules of a theory, gives
us a natural ”dialectical” proof theory for the framework. In this we have two
types of interleaving derivations one for considering the attacks and one for
counter attacking these attacks. The proof theory then builds an admissible
argument for a given goal by incrementally considering all its attacks and,
whenever an attack is not counter-attacked by the argument that we have
build so far, we extend this with other arguments (rules) so that it does so.
This in turn may introduce new attacks against it and the process is repeated.
The priorities amongst the rules help us move from one type of derivation
to the other type e.g. we need only consider attacks that come from rules with
strictly higher priority than the rules in the argument that we are building
(as otherwise the argument that we have so far will suﬃce to counter attack
these attacks.) For the more general framework with dynamic priorities we
apply the same proof theory extended and a derivation is thus split into levels.
Now a potential attack can be avoided by ensuring that its rules are not of
higher priority than the argument rules we are building and hence we move
the computation one level up to attacks and counter attacks on the priorities
of rules. This move one level can then be repeated to bring us to a third level
of computation.
This extended proof theory has been implemented and used to build agents
that deliberate in the face of complete (relevant) information of their environ-
ments. We are currently investigating how to extend this implementation
further with (simple forms of ground) abduction, required for the computa-
tion of supporting evidence in the face of incomplete information about the
environment, using standard methods from abductive logic programming.
4 Related Work and Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an argumentative deliberation framework for
autonomous agents and presented how this could be applied. We have argued
that this framework has various desired properties of simplicity and modularity
and in particular we have shown how it can capture some natural aspects of the
decision making process of an autonomous agent. The framework can embody
in a direct and modular way a preference policy of the agent which can be used
to exhibit natural behaviour in an argumentation based interaction with other
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agents. The proposed argumentation framework has a simple and modular
computational model that can be used to implement easily deliberative agents.
The argumentation framework developed and used in this paper is based
on the more general and abstract notions that have emerged from a series of
previous studies on argumentation [11,8,10,7,9]. The basic notion that is used
is that of admissibility [7] which is itself a special case of acceptability [9].
It also follows the more recent approach of [19,5] who have shown the need
for dynamic priorities within argumentation when we want to apply this to
formalize law and other related problems. Our framework is close to that of
[19] in that it uses a similar background language of logic programming. They
also both have a computational model that follows a dialectical pattern in
terms of interleaving processes one for each level of arguments in the theory.
In comparison our framework is simpler using only a single notion of attack
and avoiding the separate use of negation as failure that it is subsumed by the
use of rule priorities. In [5] dynamic priorities are related to the argumentation
protocols, also called rules of order, describing which speech acts are legal in a
particular state of the argumentation. Although the interests for application
of our argumentation framework are diﬀerent the formal relation to these
frameworks is an interesting problem for further study.
In the development of agent deliberation we have introduced, in the same
spirit as [21,2], roles and context as a means to deﬁne non-static priorities
between arguments of an agent. This helps to capture the social dimension of
agents, as it incorporates in a natural way the inﬂuence of the environment
of interaction (which includes other agents) on the agents ”way of thinking
and acting”. We have shown how we can encompass, within this framework,
the relative roles of agents and how these can vary dynamically depending
on the external environment. The representation of this role and context
information is expressed directly in terms of priority rules which themselves
form arguments in the framework and are reasoned about in the same way as
the object level arguments. As a result this gives a high-level encapsulation
of these notions where changes are easily accommodated in a modular way.
The use of roles and dynamic context is a basic diﬀerence with most of
other works [22,17,15,3,1] on agent argumentation. Our work complements
and extends the approaches of [21,2] with emphasis on enriching the self ar-
gumentative deliberation of an agent. It complements these works by linking
directly the preferences between diﬀerent contexts, which these works propose,
to a ﬁrst level of roles that agents can have in a social context, called default
context, showing how roles can be used to deﬁne in a natural way priorities
between arguments of the agents ﬁlling these roles. It extends this previous
work by incorporating reasoning on these preferences within the process of
argumentative deliberation of an agent. This is done by introducing another
dimension of context, called speciﬁc context, corresponding to a second level
of deliberation for the agent. This allows a higher degree of ﬂexibility in the
adaptation of the agents argumentative reasoning to a dynamically chang-
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ing environment. In [2] the context preferences can also be dynamic but the
account of this change is envisaged to occur outside the argumentative de-
liberation of the agent. An agent decides a-priori to change the context in
which he is going to deliberate. In our case the change is integrated within
the deliberation process of the agent.
This extra level of deliberation allows us to capture the fact that recognized
roles in a context have their impact only within the default context where
they are deﬁned, although these roles always ”follow” agents ﬁlling them, as
a second identity in any other context they ﬁnd themselves. Therefore agents
who have some relationship, imposed by their respective roles, can be found in
a speciﬁc context where the predeﬁned (according to their relationship) order
of importance between them has changed.
In comparison with other works on agent argumentation our work also in-
tegrates abduction with argumentation to handle situations where the infor-
mation about the environment, currently available to the agent, is incomplete.
This use of abduction is only of a simple form and more work is needed to
study more advanced uses of abduction drawing from recent work on abduction
in agents [20]. Another direction of future work concerns dialogue modeling.
Our aim is to use our argumentative deliberation model for determining di-
alogue acts and protocols by extending the dialogue framework presented in
[14]. Currently, we are also studying how to use the proposed argumentation
framework together with work from cognitive psychology to model needs and
motivations of agents and through this to deﬁne, via argumentation theories,
diﬀerent agent personalities.
References
[1] L. Amgoud, N. Maudet, and S. Parsons. Modelling dialogues using
argumentation. In ICMAS-00, pp. 31-38, 2000.
[2] L. Amgoud and S. Parsons. Agent dialogues with conﬂicting preferences. In
ATAL01, 2001.
[3] L. Amgoud, S. Parsons, and N. Maudet. Arguments, dialogue and negotiation.
In ECAI-00, pp. 338-342, 2000.
[4] A. Bondarenko, P. M. Dung, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. An abstract,
argumentation-theoretic framework for default reasoning. Artiﬁcial Inelligence,
93(1-2):63–101, 1997.
[5] G. Brewka. Dynamic argument systems: a formal model of argumentation
process based on situation calculus. In Journal of Logic and Computation,
11(2), pp. 257-282, 2001.
[6] Y. Dimopoulos and A. C. Kakas. Logic programming without negation as
failure. In Proc. ILPS’95, pp. 369-384, 1995.
52
Kakas and Mora¨ıtis
[7] P.M. Dung. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in
nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. In Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, 77, pp. 321-357 (also in IJCAI’93), 1995.
[8] P.M. Dung, A. C. Kakas, and P. Mancarella. Negation as failure revisited. In
University of Pisa Technical Report, 1992.
[9] A. C. Kakas, P. Mancarella, and P.M. Dung. The acceptability semantics for
logic programs. In Proc. ICLP’94, pp. 504-519, 1994.
[10] A.C. Kakas. Default reasoning via negation as failure. In LNAI, Vol. 810, pp.
160-179, 1994.
[11] A.C. Kakas, R.A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. Abductive logic programming. In
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2(6), pp. 719-770, 1992.
[12] A.C. Kakas, R.S. Miller, and F. Toni. E-res: Reasoning about actions, events
and observations. In LPNMR’01, pp. 254-266, 2001.
[13] A.C. Kakas and F. Toni. Computing argumentation in logic programming. In
JLC 9(4), 515–562, O.U.P, 1999.
[14] N. Karacapilidis and P. Moraitis. Engineering issues in inter-agent dialogues.
In Proc. of 15th European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligent (ECAI02), Lyon,
France,, 2002.
[15] S. Kraus, K. Sycara, and A. Evenchik. Reaching agreements through
argumentation: a logical model and implementation. In Artiﬁcial Intelliegence,
104 pp. 1-69, 1998.
[16] P. Panzarasa, N.R. Jennings, and T. Norman. Formalising collaborative
decision-making and practical reasoning in multi-agent systems. In Journal
of Logic and Computation 12 (1), to appear, 2002.
[17] S. Parsons, C. Sierra, and N.R. Jennings. Agents that reason and negotiate by
arguying. In Logic and Computation 8 (3), 261-292, 1998.
[18] J.L. Pollock. Justiﬁcation and defeat. In Artﬁcial Intelligence Vol 67, pp. 377-
407, 1994.
[19] H. Prakken and G. Sartor. A dialectical model of assessing conﬂicting
arguments in legal reasoning. In Artﬁcial Intelligence and Law Vol 4, pp. 331-
368, 1996.
[20] F. Sadri, F. Toni, and P. Torroni. Dialogues for negotiation: agent varieties and
dialogue sequences. In ATAL01, 2001.
[21] C. Sierra, N.R. Jennings, P. Noriega, and S. Parsons. A framework for
argumentation-based negotiation. In ATAL-97, pp. 167-182, 1997.
[22] K. Sycara. Argumentation: Planning other agents’ plans. In IJCAI-89, pp.
517-523, 1989.
[23] M. Wooldridge, N.R. Jennings, and D. Kinny. The gaia methodology for agent-
oriented analysis and design. In JAAMAS 3 (3), pp. 285-312, 2000.
53
